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The regulatory environment surrounding subprime mortgages, 
workouts and foreclosures and bank liquidity is constantly changing.  
For example, Republican presidential candidate Senator John McCain 
(R-AZ) has recently announced a plan implementing proposals formally 
touted by Democratic primary candidate Senator Hillary Clinton (D-
NY).1  Proposed legislation that would allow bankruptcy judges to alter 
the terms of subprime mortgages, essentially dead in Congress as of the 
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 1. See McCain-Palin 2008, Immediate Relief for American Families – HOME 
plan, http://www.johnmccain.com/Issues/JobsforAmerica/relief.htm (last visited Oct. 
22, 2008) (discussing McCain’s plan to require “participating lenders to forgive part of 
the loan principal and then write a new loan that would be backed by the federal 
government . . . .”); infra Part II.D. 
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spring of 2008, regained new life and was in contention for inclusion in 
the bailout package passed this fall.2 
As regulation continues to develop, scholarly debate concerning the 
federal government’s responses is ongoing.  Yet, while underscoring the 
federal government’s responses, the legal philosophies discussed herein 
have seldom been explicitly mentioned in the scholarly analyses to date.  
Thus, in discussing the legal philosophical bases of the federal 
government’s proposed regulations and legislation, this Note brings to 
the forefront important considerations which so far have been absent in 
scholarly commentary and public press. 
INTRODUCTION 
“You only learn who has been swimming naked when the tide goes 
out – and what we are witnessing at some of our largest financial 
institutions is an ugly sight.”3  Given the losses tied to subprime mortga-
ges4 by top U.S. financial institutions,5 few could argue the cogency of 
these words in Warren Buffett’s annual letter to the shareholders of 
Berkshire Hathaway Inc. on March 8, 2008.6  Perhaps “ugly” was even 
an understatement: Bear Stearns Cos., once the fifth largest investment 
bank,7 saw its share price drop from a 52-week high above $156 to a 
stock-for-stock acquisition price by J.P. Morgan valued at just $2 per 
share.8 
Faced with a “credit crunch” causing the collapse of Bear Stearns9 
and widespread fear that other U.S. financial institutions may soon 
follow, a decline in wealth for American households for the first time 
since 200210 and economists’ claims of recession, the Board of 
Governors of the Federal Reserve System (the “Fed”) reacted in the 
Spring of 2008 by cutting the cost of short-term borrowing to add 
liquidity to the global financial market.11  In direct response to the 
securities losses tied to subprime mortgages, the Fed also issued changes 
to Regulation Z, a federal regulation governing home mortgages.12  
Further, home value depreciation and mounting foreclosures on homes 
owned by subprime borrowers prompted federal legislation to reform the 
U.S. residential mortgage lending industry.13  In addition to supporting 
the proposed legislation, former Democratic presidential primary candi-
 2. Sarah Lueck et al., Bailout Plan Rejected, Markets Plunge, Forcing New 
Scramble to Solve Crisis, WALL ST. J., Sept. 30 2008, at A1; infra Part II.C. 
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dates Hillary Clinton and President-elect Barack Obama vowed to allo-
cate future federal funds to help owners who are unable to make the 
monthly payments on their subprime mortgage loans.14 
From an economic standpoint, debate among politicians and 
 3. Letter from Warren E. Buffett, Berkshire Hathaway Inc., to Shareholders (Feb. 
2008), at 3, available at http://www.berkshirehathaway.com/letters/2007ltr.pdf. 
 4. Subprime borrowers generally have credit profiles that may include one or 
more of the following: (1) multiple delinquencies in payments in the previous 12-24 
months, (2) a judgment, charge-off, repossession or foreclosure, (3) bankruptcy, (4) “a 
credit bureau risk score (FICO) of 660 or below (depending on the product/collateral), 
or other bureau or proprietary scores with an equivalent default probability likelihood,” 
or (5) total minimum monthly debt payments greater than 50% of gross income.  Office 
of the Comptroller of the Currency, Interagency Guidance on Subprime Lending, 
Bulletin BL 99-10 (Mar. 1, 1999), at 3, available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/ 
boardDocs/SRletters/2001/sr0104a1.pdf. 
 5. For an overview of the losses experienced by U.S. financial institutions due to 
investments in subprime mortgages, see infra Part I. 
 6. See Gordon T. Anderson, Buffett Speaks, CNNMoney.com, Mar. 8, 2004, 
http://money.cnn.com/2004/03/06/pf/buffett_letter/index.htm (providing a brief summa-
ry of Buffet’s letter and confirming the date of release). 
 7. See Kate Kelly, et al., Fed Races to Rescue Bear Stearns In Bid to Steady 
Financial System, WALL ST. J., Mar. 15, 2008, at A1. 
 8. Robin Sidel, et al., J.P. Morgan Buys Bear in Fire Sale, As Fed Widens Credit 
to Avert Crisis, WALL ST. J., Mar. 17, 2008, at A1.  Morgan Stanley later increased its 
bid to near $10 per share. Andrew Ross Sorkin, JPMorgan Raises Bid for Bear Stearns 
to $10 a Share, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 24, 2008, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com 
/2008/03/24/business/24deal-web.html. 
 9. The sudden collapse of Bear Stearns resulted in what many investors 
considered a “fire sale.”  See Sidel, supra note 8. 
 10. Total wealth of American households slipped approximately $533 billion in the 
fourth quarter of 2007 to $57.7 trillion, the first drop since 2002.  Sudeep Reddy & Sara 
Murray, Housing, Bank Troubles Deepen, WALL ST. J., Mar. 7, 2008, at A1, available 
at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB120485071664018195.html. 
 11. For an analysis of the Federal Reserve’s role in the sale of Bear Stearns and its 
actions following the sale, see Bob Davis, et al., U.S. Mulls Next Steps in Crisis, WALL 
ST. J., Mar. 18, 2008, at A1, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB120580840784 
044347.html; Greg Ip & Greg Hitt, Mortgage Securities Back Fed Loan to Bear 
Stearns, WALL ST. J., Apr. 2, 2008, at C2, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB 
120709943050782205.html; Kara Scannell & Sudeep Reddy, Officials Say They Sought 
to Avoid Bear Bailout, WALL ST. J., Apr. 4, 2008, at A1, available at http://online.wsj. 
com/article/SB120722972567886357.html?mod=hpp_us_whats_news. 
 12. See infra Part II.B. 
 13. See infra Part II.C. 
 14. See infra Part II.D. 
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scholars concerning the degree to which the federal government should 
respond to dramatic changes occurring in the financial marketplace has 
been robust.15  This Note seeks to approach the question from a different 
angle, addressing the federal government’s response from a legal 
philosophical perspective.  Further, while this Note will not address the 
issue of preemption, a parallel debate concerning preemption and state 
versus federal regulation of mortgage lending standards is ongoing.16 
Part I of this Note will summarize the extent of the blow sustained 
thus far by financial institutions and investors brought about by 
subprime mortgage defaults.  Part II.A will then list the steps taken by 
the executive administration under President George W. Bush and 
Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson, Jr. to increase regulation of the 
residential mortgage lending industry.  Part II.B will discuss the steps 
 15. See, e.g., Scannell & Reddy, supra note 12; David Wessel, Ten Days that 
Changed Capitalism, WALL ST. J., Mar. 27, 2008, at A1, available at http://online.wsj. 
com/public/article/SB120657397294066915-kps7JpgtZ94AzNLCc8q064xrf9s_200903 
27.html.  For analysis of the “moral hazard” issue featured by Scannell & Reddy, see 
infra Part III.A. 
 16. See, e.g., G. Marcus Cole, Markets and the Law: Protecting Consumers From 
Consumer Protection: Watters v. Wachovia Bank, 2006-07 Cato Sup. Ct. Rev. 251, 252 
(2006 /2007) (“The central issue was whether federalism demanded that a state be 
permitted to continue to impose regulations on a state mortgage lender, including 
visitation, when a national bank acquires the state mortgage lender, or whether such 
state regulation was now preempted by federal law.”); Jonathan L. Entin & Shadya Y. 
Yazback, City Governments and Predatory Lending, 34 Fordham Urb. L.J. 757 (2007) 
(discussing city efforts to regulate predatory lending pursuant to state laws and federal 
regulations); Julia Patterson Forrester, Still Mortgaging the American Dream: 
Predatory Lending, Preemption, and Federally Supported Lenders, 74 U. Cin. L. Rev. 
1303 (2006) (examining the preemption debate, particularly in the context of federally 
supported lenders); Elizabeth R. Schiltz, The Amazing, Elastic, Ever-Expanding 
Exportation Doctrine and Its Effects on Predatory Lending Regulation, 88 Minn. L. 
Rev. 518, 520 (2004) (“Assuming the consumer credit market requires some statutory 
regulation, are state or federal laws more effective?”).    See Eric C. Bartley, Comment, 
. . . And Federal Regulation for All: Federally Regulating the Mortgage Banking 
Industry, 2006 Mich. St. L. Rev. 477, 478, for an overview of federal acts regulating 
mortgage lending practices and standards.  See also Richard Cowden, 90 BUREAU 
NAT’L AFF. 291 (Feb. 18, 2008), (“The OCC [Office of the Comptroller of Currency] 
issued regulations in 2004 asserting that it has preemptive jurisdiction over certain 
mortgage lending consumer protections as they apply to national banks and their 
operating subsidiaries.  The agency has successfully fought off litigation by states that 
have challenged the OCC’s preemptive powers . . . .”). 
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the Fed has taken under Chairman Ben Bernanke.17  Part II.C will com-
pare several proposed bills under review by Congress as of the spring of 
2008 and Part II.D will discuss plans for increased federal aid by Clinton 
and Obama.  Finally, by analyzing the federal government’s responses 
under widely-recognized legal philosophies, Part III will argue that 
valuable and necessary considerations may thus far have been over-
looked in the public debate concerning what the federal government 
should do to stem foreclosures and ease the subprime fallout. 
I.  THE EXTENT OF THE SUBPRIME FALLOUT 
On October 4, 2006, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, 
the Fed, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (the “FDIC”), the 
Office of Thrift Supervision, and the National Credit Union Adminis-
tration (together, the “Agencies”) issued the Interagency Guidance on 
Non-Traditional Mortgage Products (the “2006 Guidance”).18  Recog-
nizing the possibility of increased risk of mortgage defaults due to the 
growing popularity of “Nontraditional Mortgage Loans,”19 the 2006 
Guidance required greater interest rate and principal amount under-
writing standards for those kinds of mortgages.  Although the Agencies 
acknowledged that several of the comments they received in response to 
their initial draft of the 2006 Guidance – including those from several 
community and consumer organizations, banks, and financial industry 
associations – unambiguously indicated that reduced documentation 
loans20 should not be offered to subprime borrowers,21 the Agencies 
 17. This part will be limited to regulations explicitly addressed as responses to 
subprime mortgage lending.  To the extent that the problems spurring from U.S. sub-
prime mortgage lending have contributed to a global credit crisis, broader efforts by the 
Fed to add liquidity and lower short-term interest rates and a broader increase in 
regulatory oversight of financial markets in general largely fall outside the scope of this 
Note. 
 18. Interagency Guidance on Nontraditional Mortgage Product Risks, 71 Fed. Reg. 
58,609 (Oct. 4, 2006). 
 19. The Guidance defined nontraditional mortgage loans “as ‘interest-only’ mort-
gages where a borrower pays no loan principal for the first few years of the loan and 
‘payment option’ adjustable-rate mortgages (“ARMs”) where a borrower has flexible 
payment options with the potential for negative amortization.” Id. at 58,613. 
 20. “Reduced documentation loans” refers to the practice of underwriting a 
mortgage loan based on a level of income and/or financial assets that is stated on the 
application but not duly verified or documented, id. at 58,611. 
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largely ignored the advice and specifically “declined to provide 
guidance recommending reduced documentation loans be limited to any 
particular set of circumstances.”22  As the ensuing year illustrated, how-
ever, the 2006 Guidance was insufficient to quell the Agencies’ fears 
concerning popular, yet risky, mortgage practices. 
Fueled by the same fears as in 2006, the Agencies next published 
the Statement on Subprime Mortgage Lending23 on June 29, 2007 (the 
“2007 Statement”), addressing risks associated with lending adjustable 
rate mortgages (“ARMs”) to subprime borrowers.  The Agencies stated 
that ARMs offered to subprime borrowers typically have one or more of 
the following characteristics: (1) “[l]ow initial payments based on a 
fixed introductory rate that expires after a short period and then adjusts 
to a variable index rate plus a margin for the remaining term of the 
loan,” (2) “[v]ery high or no limits on how much the payment amount or 
the interest rate may increase,” (3) “[l]imited or no documentation of 
borrowers’ income,” (4) “[p]roduct features likely to result in frequent 
refinancing to maintain an affordable monthly payment,” and (5) 
“[s]ubstantial prepayment penalties and/or prepayment penalties that 
extend beyond the initial fixed interest rate period.” 24  The 2007 
Statement reiterated the enhanced underwriting guidelines of the 2006 
Guidance and further instructed lenders: “Stated income and reduced 
documentation loans to subprime borrowers should be accepted only if 
there are mitigating factors that clearly minimize the need for direct 
verification of repayment capacity.”25  The Agencies’ 2006 Guidance 
and 2007 Statement proved to be too little, too late. 
By the end of 2007, a group of twenty-eight of the largest financial 
institutions participating in the secondary mortgage market had written 
down $132.6 billion from their balance sheets due to losses in invest-
ments tied to U.S. mortgages.26  The delinquency rate for home loans 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Fed. Res. Sys. Docket No. OP-1278, available at http://www.federalreserve. 
gov/newsevents/press/bcreg/bcreg20070629a1.pdf. 
 24. Id. at 9-10. 
 25. Id. at 12 (emphasis added).  “Mitigating factors” include “substantial” liquid 
reserves that are verified by the lender, or when a borrower with favorable payment 
performance seeks to refinance an existing mortgage with a new loan of a similar size 
and with similar terms, and the borrower’s financial condition has not deteriorated. 
 26. Credit-Crunch Toll: $133 Billion of CDO, MBS Writedowns, ASSET-BACKED 
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quarter of 2007, its highest mark since 1985.27  Seemingly every day, 
tales of entire neighborhoods succumbing to foreclosures due to this un-
shakable leech known as “Subprime” flooded the nation’s newspapers.28  
Approximately one out of five subprime loans were past due in the 
fourth quarter of 2007 and a devastating 13 percent had already entered 
foreclosure proceedings.29 
Perhaps not as emotionally jarring, but equally dismaying, is that 
economists’ views forecasting the limit for potential future subprime 
losses vary to a wide degree, and seem to be continually changing.30  
One would be hard-pressed to find any authority today willing to 
concede that this leech, Subprime, has sucked its last drop of blood. 
II.  THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT RESPONSE 
A.  The Bush Administration: Market Guidance  
and Market Encouragement 
 
 
ALERT, Jan. 18, 2008. 
 27. See Reddy & Murray, supra note 10. 
 28. See Gretchen Morgenson & Jonathan D. Glater, Foreclosure Machine Thrives 
on Woes, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 30, 2008, at BU, available at http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2008/03/30/business/30mills.html (citing a study by RealtyTrac that found 225,000 U.S. 
homes in foreclosure as of the end of February 2008, up 60 percent from a year earlier).  
I also credit Ms. Morgenson with associating subprime mortgage losses with the 
characteristics of a leech, although I am not sure if she was the first to coin the term. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Compare Janet Morrissey, How Bad Will the Mortgage Crisis Get?, TIME, Feb. 
19, 2008, available at http://www.time.com/time/business/article/0,8599,1714725,00. 
html (citing analyst Bose George with a prediction of  $250 billion in total losses and 
Columbia University Professor Charles Calomiris estimate of between $300 and $400 
billion), and Rick Chung & Sonia Persaud, Foreword: A Year of Uncertainty and 
Turmoil – Overview of the Subprime Mortgage Crisis and Its Effects in the Markets,  
Special Edition Subprime 2007, BLOOMBERG LAW REPORTS – BANKING & FINANCE 2 
(estimating that future losses could reach $300 billion), with Greg Ip, Study Finds Wider 
Impact of Mortgage Losses, WALL ST. J., Mar. 1, 2008, at A2, available at 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB120433882809904921.html?mod=rss_whats_news_us_
business (citing a study conducted by David Greenlaw of Morgan Stanley, Jan Hatzius 
of Goldman Sachs Group Inc., Anil Kashyap of the University of Chicago and Hyun 
Song Shin of Princeton University which estimates futures losses of approximately 
$400 billion). 
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In the spring of 2008, Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson and 
President George W. Bush were the strongest advocates for the position 
that the federal government should allow the market to correct itself, 
consistently warning against the consequences of over-regulation.31  
Their primary concern, which they both reiterated constantly throughout 
the fall of 2007, was that “[a] federal bailout of lenders would only en-
courage a recurrence of the problem. It’s not the government’s job to 
bail out speculators, or those who made the decision to buy a home they 
knew they could never afford.”32  The President summarized steps he 
encouraged, which included (1) short term changes to the Federal 
Housing Administration (FHA) allowing “qualified borrowers who are 
delinquent because of an interest rate reset the opportunity to refinance 
into an FHA-insured mortgage,”33 (2) reforming the federal tax code to 
ensure that homeowners whose mortgages are modified are not taxed for 
the forgiven indebtedness,34 (3) a “foreclosure avoidance initiative” 
offering foreclosure counseling and refinancing, and (4) “a variety of 
 31. George W. Bush, President of the United States of Am., Address to the 
Economic Club of New York (Mar. 14, 2008), http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/ 
releases/2008/03/print/20080314-5.html (explaining the Bush administrations passage 
of a one time tax rebate to induce growth in the U.S. economy and warning against “law 
and regulation that will make it harder for the markets to recover – and when they 
recover, make it harder for this economy to be robust.”). See Michael M. Phillips & 
John D. McKinnon, Bush Warns Congress Over Mortgage Plans, WALL ST. J., Mar. 15, 
2008, at A2. 
 32. George W. Bush, President Bush Discusses Homeownership Financing (Aug. 
31, 2007), available at  http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2007/08/print/20070 
831-5.html; see George W. Bush, Bush Blasts Congress for Not Doing More for 
Homeowners, WASHINGTON WIRE: WSJ.COM (Dec. 6, 2007), http://blogs.wsj.com/wash 
wire/2007/12/06/bush-blasts-congress-for-not-doing-more-for-homeowners/. 
 33. However, eligibility requirements, such as the borrower needing some equity in 
the property, have limited the program.  See Economic Stimulus Act of 2008, 122 Stat. 
613, § 202 (temporarily increasing the maximum limitation for FHA loans); Ben S. 
Bernanke, Chairman, U.S. Fed. Res., Speech At the Independent Community Bankers 
of America Annual Convention (March 4, 2008), available at http://www.federal 
reserve.gov/newsevents/speech/bernanke20080304a.htm [hereinafter Bernanke ICB 
Speech].  Additional FHA modernization bills have been passed by the House and 
proposed in the Senate.  See Security Against Foreclosures and Education Act of 2008, 
110 S. 2734 (proposed in the Senate March 7, 2008); Expanding American 
Homeownership Act of 2007, 110 H.R. 1852 (passed in the House on September 18, 
2007). 
 34. See Mortgage Forgiveness Debt Relief Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-142, 121 
Stat. 1803 (2007). 
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actions to make the mortgage industry more transparent, more reliable 
and more fair . . . .”35 
In October 2007, President Bush’s administration, led by Secretary 
Paulson, launched the HOPE NOW Alliance, consisting of mortgage 
servicers (companies who accept mortgage payments and eventually 
distribute them to investors), lenders, and other participants in the 
mortgage market.36  The mission of HOPE NOW is to find ways for 
homeowners who want to stay in their homes avoid foreclosure.37  The 
number of participants in the alliance grew to 94 percent of the subprime 
mortgage servicing market, and Paulson subsequently announced an 
additional initiative, Project Lifeline, specifically targeting foreclosure 
avoidance.  Commentators’ immediate responses to the industry initia-
tives were mixed.38  Still, encouraged by increasing voluntary coalition 
 35. See Bush, supra note 32. 
 36. See Statement by Sec’y Henry M. Paulson, Jr., Announcement of New Private 
Sector Alliance – HOPE NOW, (Oct. 10, 2007), http://www.treasury.gov/press/releases 
/hp599.htm [hereinafter Paulson HOPE NOW Speech].  HOPE NOW is “an alliance be-
tween counselors, servicers, investors, and other mortgage market participants to maxi-
mize outreach efforts to at-risk homeowners and help them stay in their homes.”  HOPE 
NOW Frequently Asked Questions, http://www.hopenow.com/site_tools/faqs.php. 
 37. See Paulson HOPE NOW Speech, supra note 36.  For a detailed description of 
the HOPE NOW streamlined response and metrics tracking the program’s results, see 
American Securitization Forum, Streamlined Foreclosure and Loss Avoidance 
Framework for Securitized Subprime Adjustable Rate Mortgage Loans, Dec. 6, 2007, 
http://www.americansecuritization.com/uploadedFiles/FinalASFStatementonStreamline
dServicingProcedures.pdf. 
 38. Compare Michael M. Phillips et. al., Battle Lines Form Over Mortgage Plan, 
Wall St. J., Dec. 7, 2007, at A1 (confirming that many democrats view the HOPE NOW 
initiative as not going far enough to help homeowners avoid foreclosure) with Sudeep 
Reddy et. al, Some Cry Foul Over Relief Plan for Borrowers, WALL ST. J., Dec. 4, 
2007, at D1, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB119673435431012677.html? 
mod=hps_us_whats_news (“[S]ome would-be homeowners who have been waiting for 
house prices to fall say the government proposal would prop up prices, and thus keep 
them out of the market.”).  See Henry M. Paulson, Jr., U.S. Treasury Secretary, 
Remarks on Housing and Capital Markets before the New York Society of Securities 
Analysts, (Jan. 7, 2008), http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/hp757.htm (“[HOPE 
NOW] has also received the most criticism due to the mistaken perception that it 
abrogates contracts.  It does not. . . .  Servicers will pursue the[ir] contractual obliga-
tions by pursuing all loss-mitigation options when it is in the best interest of investors, 
as they normally would.  Investors are part of this industry-wide solution . . . .”). 
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by market participants, Secretary Paulson continued to warn against 
overreaching regulation.39 
B.  The Fed: Proposed Amendments to Regulation Z 
As the evidence of the scope of the fallout from subprime mortgage 
loan defaults continued to mount in the fall of 2007, the Fed announced 
its intention to actively mitigate losses.40  In November 2007, it identi-
fied several causes of the subprime fallout, including: unemployment;41 
loosening of underwriting standards; the originate-to-distribute model 
enabled by investors purchasing securities backed by subprime 
mortgages in the secondary market;42 resets on adjustable rate subprime 
 
 39. See Comments by Secretary Paulson on Economy and Housing, Feb. 28, 2008, 
http://www.treasury.gov/press/releases/hp847.htm (“Homeowners who gambled in the 
housing market and viewed their purchase as a short term investment may choose to 
walk away.  Those who do this are nothing more than speculators, and they are not the 
focus of our efforts.”). 
 40. See Randall S. Kroszner, Speech At the Consumer Bankers Association 2007 
Fair Lending Conference, (Nov. 5, 2007), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/ 
newsevents/speech/kroszner20071105a.htm [hereinafter Fair Lending Conf. Speech] 
(“These circumstances call for high degree of collaboration and innovation to identify 
solutions that can keep borrowers confronting foreclosure in their homes. . . .  It is 
imperative that we work together as a financial services community to look for ways to 
help borrowers address their mortgage challenges . . . .”); see also Kroszner, Speech At 
the American Securitization Forum 2008 Conference, (Feb. 6, 2008), available at 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/kroszner20080204a.htm [hereinafter 
ASF Conf. Speech] (stating the Fed’s aim to protect subprime mortgage borrowers and 
preserve borrower choice). 
 41. Kroszner, Fair Lending Conf. Speech, supra note 40. 
 42. Id.; Frederic S. Mishkin, Speech At the U.S. Monetary Policy Forum (Feb. 29, 
2008), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/mishkin200802 
29a.htm; Ben S. Bernanke, Speech at the Women in Housing and Finance Exchequer 
Club Joint Luncheon (Jan. 10, 2008), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/news 
events/speech/bernanke20080110a.htm.  A thorough review and analysis of the second-
ary market for subprime mortgage loans is beyond the scope of this Note.  However, an 
understanding of the secondary market and its impact on the growth of subprime 
mortgages is critical.  For an extremely helpful analysis of how securitization of sub-
prime mortgages works and its effect on the interests of market participants see 
Kathleen C. Engel & Patricia A. McCoy, Turning a Blind Eye: Wall Street Finance of 
Predatory Lending, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 2039 (2007).  For views on rating agencies’ 
roles in structured products, including securities backed by subprime mortgage loans, 
see David Reiss, Subprime Standardization: How Rating Agencies Allow Predatory 
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mortgage loans;43 and flawed underwriting standards based on the pre-
mise that “house prices would continue to rise rapidly.”44  Additionally, 
Fed Chairman Ben S. Bernanke noted that the increase in supply of 
homes for sale and subsequent falling home prices limited subprime 
borrowers’ ability to avoid foreclosure.45 
In January 2008, the Fed proposed rule changes to Regulation Z46 
(“Reg Z”), which implements federal legislation already governing the 
mortgage market, including the Truth in Lending Act (“TILA”)47 and 
the Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act (“HOEPA”).48  The 
proposed Reg Z amendments seek to: (1) protect borrowers from 
“unfair, abusive, or deceptive lending and servicing practices while 
preserving responsible lending and sustainable homeownership”; (2) 
ensure that mortgage advertisements “provide accurate and balance 
information and do not contain misleading or deceptive representations”; 
and (3) provide consumers who are purchasing or refinancing homes 
with “transaction-specific disclosures early enough to use while 
shopping for a mortgage.”49 To achieve these aims, the proposed amend-
Lending to Flourish in the Secondary Mortgage Market, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 985 
(2006). 
 43. Bernanke, supra note 42. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Bernanke ICB Speech, supra note 33. 
 46. 12 C.F.R § 226 (2003). 
 47. 15 U.S.C § 1601 (2001). 
 48. Riegle Community Development & Regulation Information Act of 1994, Pub. 
L. No. 103-325, 108 Stat. 2160 (1994). 
 49. 73 Fed. Reg. 1672, 1672 (Jan. 9, 2008); see Bernanke, Speech At the National 
Community Reinvestment Coalition Annual Meeting (Mar. 14, 2008), available at http: 
//federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/bernanke20080314a.htm [hereinafter Bernanke 
NCRC Speech] (“We believe these proposed rules will help protect mortgage borrowers 
from unfair and deceptive practices.  At the same time, we did not want to create rules 
that were so open-ended or costly to administer that responsible lenders would pull out 
of the subprime market.”); Kroszner, ASF Conf. Speech, supra note 40 (summarizing 
the causes of increased defaults on subprime mortgages and explaining the goals of the 
Fed’s changes to Regulation Z); Rick Chung & Sonia Persaud, Federal Reserve Board 
Proposes Regulations to Curb Unfair or Deceptive Mortgage Lending Practices, 1 
Bloomberg Law Reports – Banking & Finance 1, 1, Feb. 2008; see also Sue Kirchhoff 
& Noelle Knox, Fed Plan Reins In Dicey Mortgage Loans, USA TODAY, at 3B (Dec. 
18, 2007), available at http://www.usatoday.com/money/economy/housing/ 
2007-12-18-fed-impact_N.htm?csp=34. 
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ments outline new standards for higher-priced mortgage loans.50  If 
enacted, the proposed amendments would prohibit a pattern or practice51 
of lending higher-priced mortgage loans without considering the 
borrower’s ability to repay.52  The Fed also proposed new standards 
applicable to all mortgages which would limit mortgage broker 
compensation,53 explicitly prohibit coercion by appraisers to inflate 
property values, and prohibit certain servicing practices deemed 
abusive.54  Finally, the proposed amendments to Reg Z would create 
new standards for advertising mortgage rates and products.55  But, what 
would the proposed Reg Z amendments accomplish for Americans who 
 50. Higher-priced mortgage loans are closed-end home mortgages (not Home 
Equity Lines of Credit) with an annual percentage rate (APR) that exceeds the 
comparable Treasury security by 3 percent for first-lien loans or 5 percent for subor-
dinate-lien loans.  73 Fed. Reg. at 1680; Press Release, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. 
Res. System (Dec. 18, 2007), http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/bcreg/20 
071218a.htm [hereinafter Fed. Res. Press Release]. 
 51. “Whether a creditor had engaged in the prohibited pattern or practice would 
depend on the totality of the circumstances . . . .  [T]he Board is not proposing to adopt 
a quantitative standard for determining the existence of a pattern or practice.”  73 Fed. 
Reg. at 1688. 
 52. Id. at 1686.  Consideration of repayment ability includes the borrower’s current 
and reasonably expected income and obligations, employment and assets other than the 
collateral used to secure the mortgage. Id.; Chung & Persaud, supra note 49, at 2.   
Consideration of repayment ability should extend at least seven years from the time of 
origination based on fully-amortizing payments at the fully-indexed rate and income 
and assets that have been verified by the lender.  See 73 Fed. Reg. at 1689-90; Chung & 
Persaud, supra note 49, at 2.  The Fed has asked for comment whether lending higher-
priced mortgage loans to borrowers with debt-to-income ratios at or above 50 percent 
should create a rebuttable presumption that the lender failed to adequately consider the 
borrowers ability to repay. 73 Fed. Reg. at 1689. Finally, the proposed amendments 
would require automatic property tax and insurance payments into an escrow account 
and mandate restrictions on prepayment penalties for higher-priced mortgage loans.  Id. 
at 1693-98. 
 53. “The Board proposes to prohibit a creditor from paying a mortgage broker in 
connection with a covered transaction unless the payment does not exceed an amount 
the broker has agreed with the consumer in advance will be the broker’s total 
compensation.” 73 Fed. Reg. at 1699.  Additionally, brokers would have to disclose that 
the consumer is paying for the broker’s compensation even if all or part of the 
compensation comes directly from the lender and that the broker’s interest may conflict 
with the consumer’s interest.  Id. 
 54. Id. at 1700-03. 
 55. Id. at 1704-14; Chung & Persaud, supra note 49, at 4-6; Fed. Res. Press 
Release, supra note 50. 
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solutely nothing in this 
regard. 
C. C ards 
are already stuck with a mortgage they cannot afford, or even worse, 
already face foreclosure?  As Part II.C illustrates, many federal legis-
lators believe that the Fed’s response does ab
ongress: Reining in Loose Lending Stand  
and Stemming the Tide of Foreclosures 
Federal legislators have attacked the responses of both the Fed and 
the Bush administration for not going far enough to aid mortgage 
borrowers facing foreclosure.  In March 2008, Christopher J. Dodd (D-
CT), Chairman of the U.S. Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and 
Urban Affairs, asserted, “Put simply, these people need help now – not 
just ‘Hope Now.’  Unfortunately, the Administration, whose lax over-
sight led to this crisis, has put only a flimsy plan in place that fails to 
offer enough of either.”56  Dodd further admonished the Bush adminis-
tration for offering “only timid measures that have done little to help 
families keep their homes or restore confidence to financial markets.  It 
is time for the Administration to embrace a more comprehensive, bold, 
and effective approach that goes to the heart of the current financial 
crisi
abandoned or foreclosed properties.59  Dodd proposed a further expan-
s – the mortgage markets.”57 
To address gaps in the federal government’s response, in the spring 
of 2008 Dodd announced future legislation unofficially titled The 
Foreclosure Prevention Act of 2008.58  The Foreclosure Prevention Act 
offered a bolder approach aimed at reforming the FHA by counseling 
homeowners facing foreclosure and helping communities deal with local 
 
 56. Release from Christopher J. Dodd, U.S. Sen. for Conn., Dodd: Foreclosure 





revention Act; however, other proposed 
Month=3&Year=2008. 
 57. Statement of Christopher J. Dodd, U.S. Sen. for Conn., Dodd Statement on 
Markets, Fed Action (Mar. 17, 2008), http://banking.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?Fuse 
Action=Articles
3&Year=2008. 
 58. This is the same title as a bill introduced by Senator Harry Reid (D-NV) on 
February 13, 2008.  See S. 2636, 110th Cong. (as introduced by Sen. Reid, Feb. 13, 
2008). Reid’s proposed bill and Dodd’s forthcoming proposed bill are not identical.  
This Part focuses on Dodd’s Foreclosure P
legislation by Reid will be analyzed as well. 
 59. Christopher J. Dodd, U.S. Sen. for Conn., and Richard Shelby, U.S. Sen. for 
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sion of the FHA loan program to a maximum of 110% of the area 
median home price or 132% of the Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac (GSE) 
loan limit, whichever is lower.60  The Foreclosure Prevention Act also 
sought $10 billion for Federal tax-exempt private activity bonds to 
refinance subprime loans, $4 billion in Community Development Block 
Grant Funds to assist communities hardest hit by foreclosures, $100 
million for additional foreclosure avoidance counseling, and further 
assistance to homeowners and homebuilders in the form of tax modifi-
cations.61 
Echoing Dodd’s call for greater federal government response, 62 in 
March 2008 Barney Frank (D-MA), Chairman of the House Committee 
on Financial Services, announced the proposed FHA Housing Stabili-
zation & Homeownership Retention Act,63 providing, according to 
Frank’s estimates, sufficient funds to allow the FHA to refinance up to 
$300 billion of mortgages on homes at risk of foreclosure.64  Frank’s bill 
would also provide $10 billion in non-recourse, zero-interest loans and 
grants to the state for the purchase of vacant and foreclosed homes.65  It 
would require existing lenders to accept “a substantial write-down of 
principal,” and that the new FHA loan be one that the borrower can 
“reasonably be expected to pay.”66  Upon the sale of the property or 
refinancing of the mortgage, the FHA would be entitled to a minimum 
Ala., Dodd, Shelby Announce Bipartisan Housing Stimulus Package (Apr. 2, 2008), 
http://dodd.senate.gov/index.php?q=node/4351. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. 
 62. “I am pleased that Secretary Paulson and the Administration continue to encou-
rage the private sector to take reasonable steps to minimize foreclosures.  Obviously 
much more is needed, but I welcome the progress that has been made.”  Press Release, 
Barney Frank, Chairman of H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., Frank Statement on HopeNow 
Alliance Announcement (Jan. 18, 2008),  http://www.house.gov/apps/list/press/financial 
svcs_dem/press011807.shtml. 
 63. FHA Housing Stabilization & Homeownership Retention Act of 2008, H.R. 
5830, 110th Cong (2008) [hereinafter Housing & Homeownership Act]. 
 64. Press Release, H. Comm. on Fin. Servs. Frank Announces New Economic, 
Mortgage and Housing Rescue Proposal (Mar. 13, 2008), http://www.house.gov/frank/ 
fha0308.html (last visited Apr. 5, 2008). 
 65. The non-recourse, zero-interest loans would be required to go to families with 
incomes no greater than 140 percent of the area median income and in the case of 
owner-occupied properties the loan must be repaid with two years.  Housing & 
Homeownership Act, supra note 63. 
 66. Id. 
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exit fee of 3.0 percent of the FHA loan balance.67  Eligibility for the 
FHA mortgage, however, could be limited by the date the mortgage was 
obtained, mandatory income documentation on the new FHA mortgage, 
and other factors.68  Frank’s bill would also require additional funds for 
new oversight, annual audit, and semi-annual reporting capacity.69 
In assessing the Frank-Dodd FHA Acts,70 one should certainly 
consider the economic impact the legislation could have on mortgage 
borrowers who are facing foreclosure, as well as the potential economic 
impact on the nation as a whole.  Part IV of this Note suggests, however, 
that in analyzing the Frank-Dodd FHA Acts and the other responses 
summarized in this Part, perhaps the very nature of law in America 
requires the federal government’s responses to extend beyond economic 
considerations.  Should the soundness of the Frank-Dodd FHA Acts be 
judged on whether they accomplish a morally just result, even if such a 
result comes at a tremendous economic cost?  If so, what is the morally 
optimal result these and the other federal responses should aim to 
achieve?  The remainder of this Part will discuss several other federal 
responses to the subprime meltdown.  Part IV will then attempt to shed 
light on these questions. 
Taking a forward-looking approach similar to the Fed’s, 
Representative Bradley Miller (D-NC) introduced the Mortgage Reform 
and Anti-Predatory Lending Act of 200771 (the “Miller Act”).  The 
Miller Act, passed by the House of Representatives on November 15, 
2007, sought to significantly expand on the Fed’s amendments to Regu-
lation Z.72  The Miller Act would: (1) establish a national Mortgage 
 67. Id.  The FHA may be entitled to an additional percentage of profits if the sale 
or refinancing occur within five years of origination of the FHA loan. 
 68. Proposed eligibility criteria included: (1) the property must be a owner-
occupied primary residence; (2) the refinanced mortgage must have been originated 
between January 1, 2005 and July 1, 2007; (3) the borrower’s debt-to-income ratio must 
have been at least 40 percent as of March 1, 2008; (4) existing lenders must write-down 
enough to allow a loan loss reserve amount of at least 5 percent for the FHA; (5) FHA 
loans must underwritten using the current appraised home values and fully documented 
income of the borrower; and (6) no private liens may be subordinated behind the new 
FHA loan.  Id. 
 69. Id. 
 70. I will refer to the proposed FHA legislation by Frank and Dodd as the Frank-
Dodd FHA Acts. 
 71. H.R. 3915, 110th Cong. (as passed by House, Nov. 15, 2007). 
 72. Chung & Persaud, supra note 49, at 1.  H.R. 3915 was passed by the House of 
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Licensing System and Registry;73 (2) impose a minimum duty of care on 
all “loan originators”74 to present to clients mortgages that they have “a 
reasonable ability to repay”75 and that provide a “net tangible benefit” 
for borrowers who are refinancing;76 and (3) establish further restrictions 
on all mortgages that are not a “qualified mortgage”77 or “qualified safe 
harbor mortgage.”78 Mortgages that are not qualified mortgages or quali-
fied safe harbor mortgages would not be allowed to contain prepayment 
penalties; nor would originators be permitted to receive or pay, directly 
or indirectly, any incentive compensation that is based on or varies with 
Representatives on November 15, 2007 and then referred to the Senate Committee on 
Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs.  As of March 29, 2008 no further action on the 
bill has been published. 
 73. Requires all “loan originators,” defined as any person who takes a residential 
mortgage application, assists a consumer in the applying for a mortgage, or offers or 
negotiates terms of a mortgage for direct or indirect compensation, to first obtain 
registration as a loan officer or State-licensed loan originator.  Id. §§ 101, 103.  
Mandates waiting periods for license renewal following revocation or conviction of a 
felony and minimal education requirements for registrants.  Id. §§ 104, 129A. 
 74. See definition cited supra note 73. 
 75. Id. § 129A(2)(B)(i).  Ability to repay shall be based on consideration of duly 
verified: (1) credit history, (2) present and reasonably certain future income, (3) debt, 
(4) employment, and (5) “other financial resources” other than equity in the home used 
as collateral to obtain the mortgage.  Id. § 129B(a)(3).  Further, a “good faith deter-
mination based on verified and documented information” that the borrower has a 
reasonable ability to repay the mortgage, plus all applicable taxes, insurance and 
assessments, must be based on the mortgage’s “fully indexed rate” and fully amortizing 
payments.  Id. §§ 129B(a)(1), 129B(a) (4)(D)(iii).  “Fully indexed rate” is defined as 
prevailing rate plus the margin that will apply after any introductory rate has expired.  
Id. § 129B(a)(5). 
 76. The Fed shall be called upon to proscribe regulations to define the term “net 
tangible benefit.”  Id. § 129B(b). 
 77. “Qualified mortgages” are first lien mortgages with a rate less than or equal to: 
(1) the yield on a treasury security with a comparable maturity plus 300 basis points, or 
(2) the “most recent conventional mortgage rate,” as establish by federal regulation, 
plus 175 basis points.  Id. § 129B(c)(3).  The thresholds listed above are increased by 
200 basis points for all subordinate liens.  Id. 
 78. “Qualified safe harbor mortgages” are any residential loans: (1) for which the 
borrower’s income is fully documented and verified, (2) underwriting is based on the 
“fully indexed rate,” (3) allow no opportunity for negative amortization at time over the 
term of the loan, (4) require a fixed payment of principal and interest for at least five 
years, (5) have a margin of no greater than 300 basis points over a “single generally 
accepted interest rate index” and (6) are issued to borrowers whose proposed debt 
coverage ratio does not exceed a threshold to be determined by federal regulators.  Id. 
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the terms of any mortgage that is not a qualified mortgage.79  Therefore, 
for any mortgage that fails to meet the criteria of a qualified mortgage, 
lenders would no longer pay higher commissions to brokers for loans 
with higher interest rates.  This would eliminate the broker’s interest in 
directing the borrower toward a loan with a higher interest rate simply so 
that the broker may receive a higher commission from the lender. 
Any creditor that is found to violate the Miller Act would be 
allowed ninety days to cure.80  Failure to cure would provide the 
borrower with a defense to foreclosure and allow the borrower to bring a 
civil action against the creditor with a statute of limitations of three 
years for fixed-rate mortgages, or up to six years for adjustable rate 
mortgages.81  However, if the seller or assignor makes representations or 
warranties that no mortgages being assigned or securitized are not 
qualified mortgages or safe harbor mortgages, liability would not attach 
to the assignee or securitizer where they exercise reasonable due dili-
gence in verifying these representations and warranties.82  The Miller 
Act also sought new disclosure requirements and new restrictions on 
“high-cost mortgages,” including mandatory pre-loan counseling.83  The 
requested funding for the Miller Act was $160 million 
 79. Id. §§ 129B(f), 129A(b)(1). 
 80. Id. § 129B(d)(1)(B). 
 81. Civil action could result in the rescission of the loan, plus the borrower’s costs 
“as a result of the violation and in connection with obtaining a rescission,” and 
reasonable attorney’s fee.  Id. at § 129B(e) (describing the borrower’s defense to fore-
closure in the event of a violation). 
 82. Id. § 129B(d). 
 83. Required disclosures included the rate, monthly mortgage payment and 
payment to any escrow account for property taxes and insurance, all settlement charges, 
any fees paid to the originator by the borrower and any compensation received by the 
originator from the creditor based on the interest rate of the mortgage.  Id.  § 213.  The 
Miller Act defined “high cost mortgages” as those which, among other criteria, either:  
(1) exceed a rate greater than the yield on a treasury security with a comparable 
maturity plus 800 basis points for first lien mortgages or 1000 basis points for 
subordinate lien mortgages, (2) the points and fees, including all compensation paid 
directly or indirectly to a mortgage broker and prepayment penalties payable under the 
loan, associated with the mortgage exceed five percent of the total transaction, or (3) 
have prepayment penalties that exceed 36 months in duration or exceed two percent of 
the amount prepaid.  Id. § 301; Chung & Persaud, supra note 49, at 7, n.8.  A creditor 
would not be allowed to extend a “high-cost mortgage” to any borrower before 
certifying that the borrower has received counseling from an approved mortgage 
counselor.  Id. § 303. 
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impose a duty on lenders and loan servicers to mitigate losses before 
 
s. 
On December 12, 2007 Senator Harry Reid (D-NV) introduced the 
“Home Ownership Preservation and Protection Act of 2007”84 (the Reid 
Act) to the Senate.  Similar to the Miller Act, for all “subprime”85 and 
“nontraditional”86 mortgages, the Reid Act would: (1) create a rebuttable 
presumption that a lender failed to make the required reasonable assess-
ment of the borrower’s ability to repay the loan if the proposed total 
monthly debt exceeds 45% of the borrower’s monthly gross income;87 
(2) prohibit any prepayment penalty provision;88 (3) prohibit offering 
any compensation directly or indirectly to the originator that varies with 
the terms of the loan, includ
fit” to the borrower.90 
Reid, like Miller, sought to eliminate any conflict of interest bet-
ween the broker and the borrower that could result in the borrower 
obtaining a mortgage with a higher interest rate or other non-optimal 
terms.  The Reid Act would also impose a fiduciary duty on mortgage 
brokers for all mortgage loans requiring brokers to “act in the best 
interest of the borrower and in the utmost good faith toward the 
borrower, and refrain from compromising the rights or interests of the 
borrower in favor of the rights or interests of another, including a right 
or interest of the mortgage broker . . . .”91  Further, the Reid Act would 
 84. S. 2452, 110th Cong. (2007). 
 85. “Subprime mortgage loan” is defined in the Reid Act as a “home mortgage loan 
in which the annual percentage rate exceeds the greater of the thresholds determined” 
by the Treasury Securities Rate Spread (defined therein) or the Conventional Mortgage 
Rate Spread (defined therein).  Id. § 2. 
 86. “Nontraditional mortgage loan” is defined in the Reid Act as a “home mortgage 
loan that allows consumers to defer payment of principle or interest.”  Id. 
 87. S. 2452, 110th Cong. § 129A(a) (2007). 
 88. Id. § 129A(c). 
 89. Id. § 129A(d).  Compensation that varies with the amount of the loan is permis-
sible, however.  Id. 
 90. Id. § 129A(e).  “Net tangible benefit” shall be defined by federal regulation. 
 91. Id. § 129B(b).  For all mortgage loans, all mortgage originators shall also “act 
in good faith and with fair dealing in any transaction, practice, or course of business in 
connection with the originating of any home mortgage loan” and “make reasonable 
efforts to secure a home mortgage loan that is appropriately advantageous to the 
borrower . . . .”  Id. § 129B(a) (emphasis added).  In connection with the imposed duties 
to act in the borrower’s interests, originators would be required to verify all sources of 
the borrower’s income for all mortgage loans.  Id. § 129B(d). 
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initiating foreclosure.92  Failure to mitigate losses would constitute a de-
fense to any foreclosure and establishes liability for the lender or loan 
servicer of any actual damages plus a reasonable attorney’s fee.93 
Moreover, in contrast with the Miller Act, assignees and holders of 
security interests in connection with subprime or nontraditional mortga-
ges would be liable under any action that the borrower may bring against 
the creditor or originator for breach of fiduciary duty or failure to miti-
gate losses.94  Violation of the Reid Act could result in rescission for up 
to six years from the date of consummation and civil liability for up to 
three years from consummation.95  In lieu of rescission, the borrower 
would have the option to force the lender, servicer, or assignee to 
modify or refinance the mortgage under terms that would not breach the 
imposed fiduciary duty at the time of the transaction, plus pay all costs 
and reasonable attorney’s fees.96  Finally, the Reid Act would allow for 
transitive liability to lenders for the acts of mortgage brokers.97  The re-
quested funding for the Reid Act was equal to that of the Miller Act: 
$160 million spread over five years.98 
In September 2007, Miller also introduced the Emergency Home 
Ownership and Mortgage Equity Protection Act of 2007 (the “Miller 
Bankruptcy Act”) to the House of Representatives.99  The Miller Bank-
ruptcy Act would allow bankruptcy judges to modify certain loans to 
subprime homeowners facing foreclosure.100  Similar legislation was 
also introduced in the Senate.101  However, as of the spring of 2008 the 
 92. Id. § 129D(h) (“A lender or loan servicer shall not initiate a foreclosure of a 
home mortgage loan unless that lender or loan servicer has . . . offered, whenever 
feasible, a repayment plan, forbearance, loan modification, or other option to assist the 
borrower in bringing his or her delinquent account into arrears.”) (emphasis added). 
 93. Id. § 129D(h), (j). 
 94. Id. § 704(f). 
 95. Id. §§ 702(a), 703(b) and (d). 
 96. Id. § 705(h). 
 97. Id. § 707(i).  This provision is limited to subprime, nontraditional and “high-
cost mortgages.”  High-cost mortgages are defined in the Reid Act as “consumer credit 
transaction[s] that [are] secured by the principle dwelling of a consumer, other than a 
reverse mortgage transaction.” Id. § 101. 
 98. Id. § 901. 
 99. H.R. 3609, 110th Cong. (2007). 
 100. Id. § 3. 
 101. See S. 2133, 110th Cong. (2007); S. 2136, 110th Cong. (2007). 
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proposed bankruptcy legislation had not passed the House or the Senate 
and did not appear to be gaining much traction in either. 
D. Clinton and Obama: Federal Funds to Those Hardest Hit 
In the spring of 2008, Democratic presidential primary candidate 
Hillary Clinton and President-elect Barack Obama each proposed plans 
to help homeowners avoid foreclosure. 
Senator Clinton consistently has voiced her intention to allocate 
federal funds to help borrowers and local governments avoid fore-
closures.102  Indeed, Clinton has done more than just voice strong sup-
port for the Frank-Dodd FHA Acts.  On March 24, 2008, she proposed 
the immediate appointment of an Emergency Working Group on Fore-
closures comprised of non-partisan economists, a ninety-day moratorium 
on foreclosures, and new legislation to clarify legal liability for 
mortgage servicers who modify subprime loans to help avoid fore-
closures.103  Clinton’s previous plan called on Wall Street banks to adopt 
a five-year freeze on interest rates for all subprime mortgages.104  Her 
revised plan, called Protect American Homeowners, did not explicitly 
 
 102. See Press Release, Hillary for President, Hillary Clinton Calls on Wall Street to 
Shoulder Responsibility for the Foreclosure Crisis (Dec. 5, 2007), http://www.hillary 
clinton.com/news/release/view/?id=4532 [hereinafter Clinton Foreclosure Crisis Press 
Release] (calling for a Community Support Fund of up to $5 billion to “help hard-hit 
communities and distressed homeowners endure the foreclosure crisis . . . .”).  Senator 
Clinton has since revised that number, and it now stands at a proposed $30 billion in 
funds for states and localities “hard hit by this crisis.”  Press Release, Hillary for 
President, Hillary Clinton Delivers Remarks on Halting the Housing Crisis (Mar. 24, 
2008), http://www.hillaryclinton.com/news/release/view/?id=6700 [hereinafter Clinton 
Housing Crisis Press Release] (“This money could be used to purchase foreclosed or 
distressed properties, which cities and states could then resell to low-income families or 
convert into affordable rental housing.”);  see Press Release, Hillary for President, A 
Second Stimulus Package Focused on Housing (Mar. 20, 2008), http://www.hillary 
clinton.com/news/release/view/?id=6644 [hereinafter Clinton Stimulus Press Release] 
(“Senator Clinton’s $30 billion Emergency Housing Fund is designed to administer 
funds quickly and effectively to state, local and community groups to stem further 
foreclosures and counteract negative economic impacts in these communities.”). 
 103. Clinton Housing Crisis Press Release, supra note 102. 
 104. In December 2007, Clinton called on Wall Street to adopt a 90-day foreclosure 
moratorium and a five year freeze on the interest rates of subprime adjustable rate mort-
gages, and to provide status reports on loan modifications.  Clinton Foreclosure Crisis 
Press Release, supra note 102. 
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call for a voluntary five-year rate freeze provision.105  However, she has 
called for legislation ensuring that servicers who modify subprime loans 
to avoid foreclosure will not be found liable.  This may be an attempt to 
push the rate-freeze onto investors who have not been volunteering.  I 
will refer to Clinton’s responses as the Clinton Plan.106 
Not going as far as Clinton purportedly would, Obama proposed a 
plan that “will create a fund to help people refinance their mortgages and 
provide comprehensive supports to innocent homeowners.”107  Obama’s 
plan also called for funds to assist homeowners in selling homes that are 
“simply too expensive for their income levels.”108  New disclosure re-
quirements, criminal penalties for mortgage professionals who commit 
fraud, and foreclosure counseling for homeowners were also included in 
Obama’s plan.109  Obama would partially pay for his fund by increasing 
“penalties on lenders who acted irresponsibly and committed fraud.”110  
Obama, however, must therefore assume that such lenders will still be 
solvent when his plan goes into effect.  Further, any remaining funds 
necessary to implement his plan were not expressly accounted for as of 
the spring of 2008. 
III.  A LEGAL PHILOSOPHICAL ANALYSIS: TOO FAR OR NOT FAR ENOUGH? 
Senator Clinton has been one of the loudest proponents of the 
 105. See Press Release, Hillary for President, Hillary Clinton’s Plan to Protect 
American Homeowners (Mar. 24, 2008), http://www.hillaryclinton.com/news/release/ 
view/?id=6691. 
 106. Clinton Foreclosure Crisis Press Release, supra note 102. (“If Wall Street does 
not voluntarily agree to the three-step plan, and the crisis builds, Hillary will consider 
legislation that offers protection to mortgage servicers and others who work with 
borrowers to modify their mortgages.”). 
 107. BarackObama.com, Barack Obama’s Economic Agenda: Keeping America’s 
Promise, http://obama.3cdn.net/8f478c5e1bb07ca0b1_sh1umv2zy.pdf [hereinafter 
Obama Economic Agenda] (last visited Mar. 29, 2008); BarackObama.com, Protecting 
Homeownership & Cracking Down on Mortgage Fraud, http://www.barackobama.com/ 
pdf/MortgageFactSheet.pdf [hereinafter Obama Protecting Homeownership] (last visi-
ted Mar. 29, 2008). 
 108. Obama Economic Agenda, supra note 107; Obama Protecting Homeownership, 
supra note 107. 
 109. Obama Economic Agenda, supra note 107; Obama Protecting Homeownership, 
supra note 107. 
 110. Obama Economic Agenda, supra note 107; Obama Protecting Homeownership, 
supra note 107. 
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Dodd-Frank FHA Bills.111  According to Clinton, that legislation “is not 
a bailout.  It is a sensible way for all actors – lenders, investors, servicers 
and borrowers – to share responsibility, keep families in their homes and 
stabilize our communities and our economy.”112  Clinton rejected the 
most common reason for disapproval of the federal government’s 
responses thus far – the fear of moral hazard stemming from a govern-
ment bailout of market participants who bet wrong.  Part III.A will flesh 
out the moral hazard argument further.  The remaining sections of Part 
III will then illustrate that if the debate over the federal government’s 
responses is limited to the issue of economic moral hazard in the future, 
a failure to consider valuable and well-developed theories of what the 
law is, and what the law ought to achieve, may result. 
A. Moral Hazard and Market Efficiency 
According to Fed Chairman Ben Bernanke, when the government 
“overly interferes” with the marketplace, there is a potential for: 
[a] so-called moral hazard that can affect future economic decisions 
and transactions.  It is very plausible to suggest that if the 
government bails everyone out of this mess, that we will continue to 
bail out bad actors in the future, and any market discipline that 
currently remains will further erode.113 
Bernanke’s has been one of the loudest voices warning that 
government intervention may lead to moral hazard.114 
 
 111. See, e.g., Press Release, Hillary for President, Hillary Clinton Announces 
Support for New Action on the Housing Crisis (Mar. 13, 2008), http://www.hillaryclin 
ton.com/news/release/view/?id=6515 [hereinafter Clinton New Action Press Release]; 
Clinton Housing Crisis Press Release, supra note 102; Press Release, Hillary for 
President, Clinton Calls For Bold Action To Halt Housing Crisis (Mar. 24, 2008), 
http://www.hillaryclinton.com/news/release/view/?id=6693. 
 112. Clinton New Action Press Release, supra note 111. 
 113. The Near-Term Economic Outlook For The U.S. Economy: Hearing Before the 
H. Comm. on the Budget, 110th Cong. 20 (2008) (testimony of Ben S. Bernanke, 
Chairman, Fed. Res. Bd.). 
 114. See, e.g., id. (“It’s not our intention – either as a central bank or as a regulator – 
to protect those who made mistakes from the consequences of those mistakes.”); 
Bernanke ICB Speech, supra note 33 (“Concerns about fairness and the need to 
minimize moral hazard add to the complexity of the issue; we want to help borrowers in 
trouble, but we do not want borrowers who have avoided problems through responsible 
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the market to correct itself.117 
 
In fact, moral hazard may be presented as a counter-argument to 
every congressional bill proposed to help subprime borrowers.  
Economist David C. John115 has criticized the Frank-Dodd FHA Bills 
for creating a moral hazard by eliminating consequences for poor 
lending practices, forcing taxpayers to pay for increases in future FHA 
mortgage defaults, rewarding homeowners who made speculative 
investments, and creating the perception that “it is acceptable to renege 
on an obligation because a government buyout will cut your losses.”116  
John claims that all legislation that has been proposed to date would 
create moral hazard; Congress should resist the pressure to “do 
something” and instead allow 
Analysis of potential moral hazard tends to be largely economic in 
nature, with the promotion of market efficiency as the primary 
objective.118  Scholars present arguments for more or less government 
regulation based on efficiency grounds.  On the one hand, greater regu-
lation may increase efficiency by deterring fraud and misleading trading 
practices, redistributing information more evenly across market partici-
pants, and creating compulsory disclosure duties.119  Promoting market 
efficiency and maintaining market integrity have been key motivating 
factors in the Fed’s response to subprime mortgage losses.120 
financial management to feel that they are being unfairly penalized.”). 
 115. David C. John – Staff Page, http://www.heritage.org/about/staff/DavidJohn. 
cfm. 
 116. See David C. John, Frank-Dodd Approach Won’t Fix the Mortgage Mess, The 
Heritage Foundation, Mar. 24, 2008, http://www.heritage.org/Research/Economy/wm18 
65.cfm. 
 117. Id. 
 118. See, e.g., Varouk A. Aivazian et al., The Law of Contract Modifications: The 
Uncertain Quest for a Benchmark of Enforceability, in READINGS IN THE ECONOMICS OF 
CONTRACT LAW 201-06 (Victor P. Goldberg ed., 1989) (government intervention in 
private contracts allows parties “to realize the static efficiency gains from recontracting 
relative to breach, [and] creates long-run or dynamic efficiency losses as a result of the 
attenuation of incentives to efficient risk reduction or insurance, as well as generating 
transaction cost on recontracting.”). 
 119. HUGH COLLINS, REGULATING CONTRACTS 279; see JULES L. COLEMAN, 
MARKETS, MORALS, AND THE LAW 68 (1988) (“Normative law-and-economics is the 
home of reformers. Existing legal rules are evaluated and new ones fashioned in terms 
of their economic efficiency.”). 
 120. See Kroszner, Speech At the American Securitization Forum 2008 Conference 
(Feb. 4, 2008), http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/kroszner20080204a. 
htm [hereinafter ASF Conf. Speech] (“Protecting borrowers with responsible under-
202 FORDHAM JOURNAL OF CORPORATE &  Vol. XIV 
 FINANCIAL LAW 
Yet, efficiency arguments are also used in opposition to bright-line 
regulations that restrict markets, such as requiring documentation of 
income and minimum debt-to-income ratios.121  Firms may modify 
contracts on their own rather than attempt to rely on the precise terms 
originally bargained for due to concerns about their reputation, making 
government regulation unnecessary.122  Accordingly, many argue that 
the government should step back and allow markets to fix themselves 
through firm-initiated approaches, such as the HOPE NOW alliance,123 
adding that increased regulation will only prolong losses and market 
inefficiency.124 
In Parts III.B, III.C and III.D, this Note will assess whether the eco-
nomic moral hazard and market efficiency inquiry disregards necessary 
considerations in determining how the federal government should 
respond to the subprime mortgage meltdown. 
B. The Economic Approach to Law: Efficiency is King 
For followers of the Economic Approach, the efficiency analysis 
independently satisfies the inquiry into what the law is and what the law 
should be.  According to Seventh Circuit Chief Judge Richard Posner: 
The rules assigning property rights and determining liability, the 
procedures for resolving legal disputes, the constraints imposed on law 
enforcers, methods of computing damages and determining the 
availability of injunctive relief – these and other important elements of 
the legal system can best be understood as attempts, though rarely 
 
writing standards also protects the integrity and proper functioning of the mortgage 
market by increasing investor confidence.”); Bernanke ICB Speech, supra note 33 (“A 
major thrust of our efforts is sharing relevant and timely data analysis of mortgage 
delinquencies with community groups and policymakers to efficiently target resources 
to areas most in need.”); Bernanke NCRC Speech, supra note 49 (summarizing the 
Fed’s “community affairs” effort to stem foreclosures by providing research, data 
analysis and contact information to local organizations). 
 121. See, e.g., Collins, supra note 119, at 176 (“[T]he efficient and efficacious im-
plementation of regulation against unfairness and unjust power relations in contracts 
tends to require more open-ended standards.”). 
 122. See Collins, supra note 119, at 174. 
 123. See John, supra note 116. 
 124. The Bush administration championed this view throughout 2007 and the spring 
of 2008.  See supra Part II.A and corresponding footnotes. 
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acknowledged as such, to promote an efficient allocation of resources.125 
Posner asserts that most areas of law, including common law and 
statutory fields, are driven by a consistent economic logic.126  This Note 
does not seek to evaluate the adequacy of Posner’s philosophy of law.  It 
does assert, however, that those who use economic efficiency grounds as 
the basis for their attacks or defenses of the federal responses must 
explicitly align themselves with Posner’s Economic Approach.  To the 
best of my knowledge, this step has not been taken in the scholarly 
analyses to date.  The remainder of this Note will examine whether the 
public debate has thus far overlooked several fundamental questions in 
determining the degree to which the federal government should respond 
to the subprime crisis. 
C. Legal Formalism: Certainty and the Bedrock  
Principal of Freedom of Contract 
The philosophy of law known as Legal Formalism promotes the 
theory that clear rules let parties know where they stand, thereby 
allowing for planning by market participants and expeditious dispute 
resolution.127  Market participants seek maximum certainty under the 
law, “so that it should be clear when a binding contract has been made, 
and what precise obligations have been incurred.”128  Legal philosopher 
Lon Fuller claims that laws promoting certainty and autonomy in private 
contract are natural results of human social interaction.129  Fuller further 
states, “This is particularly true in the area of commercial transactions 
where repetitive dealings tend to create standardized expectations.”130 
 
 125. Richard A. Posner, The Economic Approach to Law, 53 TEX. L. REV. 757, in 
THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF THE LAW: THE COLLECTED ECONOMIC ESSAYS OF 
RICHARD A. POSNER VOLUME ONE 44, (Fancesco Parisi ed., 2000) (citing Ehrlich & 
Posner, An Economic Analysis of Legal Rulemaking, 3 J. LEGAL STUD. 257 (1974)). 
 126. See id. at 45. 
 127. See Collins, supra note 119, at 175. 
 128. Id. 
 129. See Lon L. Fuller, The Role of Contract in the Ordering Processes of Society 
Generally, in THE PRINCIPLES OF SOCIAL ORDER 173-74 (Kenneth I. Winston 
ed., 1981) (“In confronting perplexities of this sort there is a natural tendency for the 
mind to seek out simplistic formulas that will shape our language, and with it our 
thought, in ways offering some reassurance that things are not, after all, utterly chaotic 
or so complicated as to be inaccessible to analysis.”). 
 130. Id. at 176. 
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Even under a strictly Formalist system of law, the losing parties in 
any dispute may claim that the government has treated them unfairly by 
adjudicating against them under authority of a rule or law that, while 
purportedly formal, did not give sufficient notice that their actions were 
unlawful.  As Fuller points out, “the disadvantaged applicant will feel 
that government has cheated on its own rules while the allocative agency 
will conceive of itself as discharging a function that simply cannot be 
rule-bound but requires a broad discretion to meet shifting contingencies 
and changed conditions.”131  But, Fuller continues, a shift in contingen-
cies or change in circumstances ultimately enforces the notion that “the 
lawgiver is properly regarded as promising to judge the citizen’s actions 
by rules he has announced in advance as governing those actions.”132  
Therefore, one may consider how the proposed federal responses rank in 
creating clear rules that, announced in advance, enforce the expectations 
of the various parties in the subprime mortgage market. 
Under a Legal Formalist philosophy, opponents of the discussed 
federal government responses may claim that the proposed legislation 
and regulation would introduce an unacceptable level of uncertainty into 
the mortgage market.  This uncertainty would derive from various 
sources, including the creation of (1) “reasonable” standards,133 (2) 
duties to act in “good faith,”134 (3) rebuttable presumptions,135 and (4) 
rate freezes.136  Thus, proponents of Legal Formalism would argue that, 
regardless of whether these indeterminates are economically efficient, 
the federal government’s responses stray from what the law should hold 
as primary objectives – certainty and clarity. 
D. Legal Positivism: “Open Texture” and the  
Need for Morality in Law? 
Standing in stark contrast to Fuller’s Legal Formalism, professor 
and renowned legal philosopher H.L.A. Hart, has identified “two 
connected handicaps whenever we seek to regulate, unambiguously and 
in advance, some sphere of conduct by means of general standards to be 
 
 131. Id. at 179. 
 132. Id. 
 133. See H.R. 3915 § 129B(a),(d) (2007); S. 2452 §§ 129B(d), 707(i) (2007). 
 134. See S. 2452 § 129B(b) (2007). 
 135. See S. 2452 § 129A(a) (2007). 
 136. Clinton Foreclosure Crisis Press Release, supra note 102. 
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used without further official direction on particular occasions.  The first 
handicap is our relative ignorance of fact: the second is our relative inde-
terminacy of aim.”137  Hart claims that these handicaps will prevent 
Legal Formalism from ever attaining the “certainty” it seeks.  Rather, 
Hart argues that the law must be characterized by an “open texture” 
(“Hart’s Open Texture”):138 
[A]ll [legal] systems, in different ways, compromise between two 
social needs: the need for certain rules which can, over great areas of 
conduct, safely be applied by private individuals to themselves 
without fresh official guidance or weighing up of social issues, and 
the need to leave open, for later settlement by an informed, official 
choice, issues which can only be properly appreciated and settled 
when they arise in a concrete case.139 
Dismissing Fuller’s aspirations for certainty and clarity, Legal 
Positivists may claim that the Reg Z amendments, the Miller Act and the 
Reid Act, while creating new rules140 and duties141 in the marketplace, 
satisfy Hart’s Open Texture test.  Under Hart’s approach, then, the 
federal government’s responses, even while failing to deliver strictly 
concrete rules, rightfully constitute a “settlement by an informed, 
official choice”142 and exemplify “a need for the further exercise of 
choice in the application of general rules to particular cases.”143  Legal 
Formalists may counter that the uncertainties introduced by the federal 
government’s responses fail to uphold the law’s fundamental objective 
of providing transparent rules upon which parties may rely.144  Hart 
claims, however, that the need to exercise such a choice is unavoidable.  
 137. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 128 (Oxford Univ. Press Inc. 2d Ed., 
1961). 
 138. Id. at 127-28 (“Whichever device, precedent or legislation, is chosen for the 
communication of standards of behaviour, these, however smoothly they work over the 
great mass of ordinary cases, will, at some point where their application is in question, 
prove indeterminate; they will have what has been called an open texture.”). 
 139. HART, supra note 137, at 130. 
 140. Such as minimum debt-to-income ratios and mandatory verification of income.  
See discussion supra Part II.B and Part II.C. 
 141. Such as new duties of care and liability for assignees of mortgages.  See 
discussion supra Part II.C. 
 142. HART, supra note 137, at 130. 
 143. Id. at 129. 
 144. See note 138 et seq. and corresponding text. 
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Formalism, Hart asserts, “seeks to disguise and to minimize the need for 
such choice, once the general rule has been laid down.”145 
Therefore, Positivists may direct Hart’s arguments at those who 
oppose the federal government’s responses on certainty grounds, 
claiming that the certainty argument fails to account for the need to 
exercise further choice when unforeseen cases, or mounting foreclo-
sures, present themselves.  But if certainty and clarity are not the law’s 
purpose – or at least not the law’s only purpose – what else is there? 
While Hart’s Open Texture may be considered the backbone of 
Legal Positivism, what Legal Positivism actually entails in practice has 
been debated for decades.146  The role of morality in determining what 
the law is and what it ought to be has divided Legal Positivists into two 
factions.147  Inclusive, or Soft, Legal Positivism “accepts that moral 
terms can be part of the necessary or sufficient criteria for legal validity 
in a legal system, but insist[s] that the use of moral criteria is contingent 
– and derived from the choices or actions of particular legal officials – 
rather than part of the nature of law . . . .”148  Hart acknowledged that his 
doctrine “may incorporate as criteria of legal validity conformity with 
moral principles or substantive values . . . .” and therefore may be 
aligned with Soft Positivism.149  Hard Legal Positivism, in contrast, 
 145. HART, supra note 137, at 129.  Hart claims that Legal Formalism is an attempt 
“to secure a measure of certainty or predictability at the cost of blindly prejudging what 
is to be done in a range of future cases, about whose composition we are ignorant.”  Id. 
at 129-30. 
 146. Brian H. Bix, Legal Positivism, in THE BLACKWELL GUIDE TO THE PHILOSOPHY 
OF LAW AND LEGAL THEORY 31 (Martin P. Golding & William A. Edmundson eds., 
Blackwell Publishing Ltd, 2005) (“[L]egal positivism’s distinctiveness and its point 
have become more elusive, even as it has become more established with English-
language analytical jurisprudence – perhaps because it has become more established in 
analytical jurisprudence.”). 
 147. See Scott J. Shapiro, The “Hart-Dworkin” Debate: A Shore Guide for the 
Perplexed, in RONALD DWORKIN CONTEMPORARY PHILOSOPHY IN FOCUS 23-50 (Arthur 
Ripstein ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 2007); Bix, supra note 146, at 42-44 (citing 
Ronald Dworkin, LAW’S EMPIRE, at 31-150, and Ronald Dworkin, TAKING RIGHTS 
SERIOUSLY, at 22-28). 
 148. Bix, supra note 146, at 38. 
 149. HART, supra note 137, at 250.  Hart has also claimed that a penumbra of 
uncertainty surrounds all legal rules, therefore application of a rule to specific cases in 
the “penumbral area” cannot be a matter of logical deduction, but rather “The intelligent 
decision of penumbral questions is one made not mechanically but in light of aims, 
purposes, and policies though not necessarily in light of anything we would call moral 
2008 FEDERAL REGULATION & LEGISLATION 207 
 IN THE WAKE OF THE  
                         SUBPRIME MORTGAGE MELTDOWN  
 
holds that “moral criteria can be neither sufficient nor necessary condi-
tions for the legal status of a norm.”150  This split among Legal 
Positivists introduces a critical question when considering the millions 
of Americans facing foreclosure on homes they purchased but could not 
afford:  should morality considerations matter when determining the 
propriety of the federal government’s responses?  How might any of the 
proposed federal regulations and legislation be defended on morality 
grounds? 
Of course, there will always be debate over what “morality” 
means.151  According to Hart, “[t]he equal extension to all of the funda-
mental legal protections of person and property is now generally re-
garded as an elementary requirement of the morality of political institu-
tions, and the denial of these protections to innocent persons, as a 
flagrant injustice.”152  Thus, proponents of new disclosure requirements 
in the Reg Z amendments153 and proposed legislation154 may assert that 
the government’s responses, by requiring information to be disclosed 
equally, achieve the moral aim of fairly protecting all parties’ interests. 
However, Hart further asserts that “no man could regard as morally 
acceptable the withholding from others, with needs and in circumstances 
similar to his own, of those benefits which he would not wish to be 
withheld from himself.”155  Therefore, perhaps it is here, in the realm of 
morality, that opponents may present the strongest argument against the 
principles.”  H.L.A. HART, ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE AND PHILOSOPHY 64, 67-71 
(Oxford Univ. Press 1983).  Therefore, Hart argues that morality may be a factor in 
deciding what the law ought to be, but is not necessarily always a factor. 
 150. Bix, supra note 146, at 36. 
 151. See, e.g., HART, ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE AND PHILOSOPHY, supra note 149, 
at 343-64. 
 152. Id. at 116.  Even when equal protection is denied, Hart claims “lip service is of-
ten paid to the principle of equal distribution by the pretence that the persons 
discriminated against are either criminal in intention, if not in deed, or are like children 
who are incapable of benefiting from the freedom which laws confer and are in need of 
some more paternalistic regime.”  Id. 
 153. See 12 C.F.R. § 226, supra note 46 (limiting broker compensation to an amount 
that does not exceed the amount the broker has agreed with the consumer in advance the 
broker will receive). 
 154. See H.R. 3915 § 301, supra note 71. 
 155. HART, ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE AND PHILOSOPHY, supra note 149, at 117.  
Hart continues, “If this principle is admitted, it follows that it cannot be a sufficient 
moral ground for accepting legal arrangements that the advantages they give to some 
outweigh the disadvantages for others.”  Id. 
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federal government’s calling for more than just added disclosure – not 
because the responses would cause market participants to act inefficient-
ly, but rather because the government’s responses are morally unfair and 
unequal.  The Frank-Dodd FHA Bills do not apply to all borrowers 
equally.  Instead, the bills would allow the FHA to offer lower interest 
rates only to those borrowers who have failed to pay on time.156  The 
Clinton Plan157 and the Obama Plan158 do not profess to apply taxpayer 
money equally across all homeowners, but rather only to those who are 
“hardest-hit” and “innocent.”  Is this fair?  Do these responses, in 
addition to introducing a “moral hazard” from an economic standpoint, 
fail to achieve the purpose of law because they are morally unjust? 
Josh Zinner, Co-Director of the Neighborhood Economic Develop-
ment Advocacy Project (“NEDAP”), says absolutely not.  Zinner 
believes that the great profits Wall Street banks experienced over the last 
five years by securitizing subprime loans (regardless of whether these 
profits have now been wiped out) came at the expense of innocent, low-
income borrowers, many of whom come from minority communities and 
were specifically targeted in a process known as “reverse redlining.”159  
Zinner claims that the federal government must respond with regulations 
and legislation that simultaneously hold Wall Street banks accountable 
and help distressed borrowers avoid foreclosure. 
CONCLUSION 
As usual, Mr. Buffett’s words have proven true.  The tide has gone 
out and the subprime fallout we continue to witness is both distressing 
and nauseating.  Republicans and Democrats, proponents of big govern-
ment and small, homeowners struggling to make their monthly mortgage 
payments and politicians answering to their constituencies continue to 
 156. See supra note 116. 
 157. See Clinton Stimulus Press Release, supra note 102. 
 158. See Obama Economic Agenda, supra note 107. 
 159. See Effects of the Subprime Mortgage Crisis and Efforts to Help Struggling 
Homeowners: Hearing Before the H. Fin. Servs. Subcomm. on Fin. Insts. and 
Consumer Credit, 110th Cong. 89 (2008) (Statement of Josh Zinner, Co-Director, 
Neighborhood Economic Development Advocacy Project) (“There was certainly never 
any consideration in this process for the plight of borrowers – the mortgages which put 
so many families at risk were commodified in such a way that they were seen as little 
more than pork bellies to be traded and profited from.”). 
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watch with a woeful eye.  By illustrating that federal lawmakers may 
now be operating under presumptions of what the law ought to be, this 
Note asserts that such presumptions should be explicitly stated.  Without 
this information, important considerations in assessing the responses 
may be blatantly overlooked or materially misunderstood.  As a twenty-
six year-old, I hope to look back on this time and say, “Under the 
leadership of my parents’ generation, we somehow found a way to deal 
with this awful leech called Subprime.  More importantly, we dealt with 
it the right way.”  And as I say these words, I do not think only about 
“economic efficiency.”  I hope I am not alone. 
 
